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INTERNATIONAL FOOD STANDARDS AND 
WTO LAW 
MARIELA MAIDANA-ELETTI∗ 
Standards are used in all realms of human activity in order to specify the 
characteristics of a product, or its manufacture. In the process, they fulfil a 
range of functions, such as lowering risks, increasing trust and facilitating 
predictability in a given market. Standards reduce information costs for 
market players, which in turn allows for a more efficient functioning of the 
market. For international trade in foodstuffs, harmonisation of the wide 
variety of food standards is essential in order to facilitate the global food-
sourcing trend. As traditional market access barriers are dismantled, non-
tariff measures offer a tool for the potential protection of domestic products, 
thus calling for effective forms of food governance. This article explores the 
legal implications of international standards under the TBT Agreement in the 
light of the WTO Appellate Body’s case law. It further analyses the role 
played by international standard-setting organisations, such as the CAC and 
the ISO, in predicting the outcome of pending WTO disputes. Against this 
backdrop, this article also attempts to shed light on the current legal debate 
surrounding the use of private food standards within the SPS Committee. 
I THE ROLE OF STANDARDS IN TRADE 
Standards are used in all realms of human activity in order to specify the 
characteristics of a product or its manufacture. In the process, they fulfil a range 
of functions, such as lowering risks, increasing trust and facilitating 
predictability in a given market. Hence, standard-setting aims to provide a 
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rational process to solve technical problems, based on science and governance.1 
The existence of standards reduces information costs for market players, which 
in turn allows for a more efficient functioning of the market.2 For international 
trade in foodstuffs, the harmonisation of the wide variety of food standards is 
essential to facilitate the global food-sourcing trend.3 As traditional market 
access barriers are dismantled, non-tariff measures offer a tool for the 
protection of domestic products, thus calling for effective forms of food 
governance.  
WTO law encourages, to varying extents, the design and adoption of 
international standards by imposing their use as a basis for regulation. This 
circumstance in turn creates a presumption of compliance with WTO rules that 
ultimately facilitates international trade. International standards thus act as a 
benchmark for better forms of governance while avoiding the adoption of trade-
distorting measures and promoting harmonisation. This statement holds true 
particularly for trade in foodstuffs, given that compliance with food safety and 
quality standards will ultimately determine market access. Due to this 
favourable legal framework, however, the concept of an ‘international 
standard’ has been disputed.4 In order to clarify its legal meaning, the WTO 
Appellate Body designed a compliance test5 that allows for increased legal 
certainty.  
1 Governance is understood as the shift in allocation of authority from the top down, where all 
participating players in society pursue common goals through the exercise of control; cf 
Thomas A Loya and John Boli, ‘Standardization in the World Policy: Technical Rationality 
over Power’ in John Boli and George Thomas (eds), Constructing World Culture (Stanford 
University Press, 1999) 193; generally: Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the 
Environment in a Stateless Society (Cornell University Press, 1994); Phillip Cerny, 
Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action (1995) 49 (4) International 
Organizations 595–621. 
2 Steve Charnovitz, ‘International Standards and the WTO’ (Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No 133, The George Washington University Law School, 2002) 12.  
3 Linda Fulponi, ‘Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: The Perspective of Major 
Food Retailers in OECD Countries’ (2006) 31 Food Policy 1–13. 
4 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) (‘EC-Sardines’); Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012) (‘US – Tuna II (Mexico)’); Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc 
WT/DS406/AB/R (4 April 2012) (‘US – Clove Cigarettes’); Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc 
WT/DS384/386/AB/R (29 June 2012) (‘US – COOL’). 
5 Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc WT/DS381/R (15 September 2011) [7.627].  
                                                 
2014 INTERNATIONAL FOOD STANDARDS AND WTO LAW 219 
Hence, this article explores the relevance of food standards in international 
trade. In doing so, it examines the legal standing of international standards in 
determining compliance with the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)6 
in general and its Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)7 
in particular. It also explores the role played by international standard-setting 
organisations as de facto regulators and analyses the current dilemma involving 
the legal classification of private food standards in international trade. 
II INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS UNDER WTO LAW 
A The TBT Agreement: The Three-Step Test 
The TBT Agreement recognises the importance of international standards for 
international trade and therefore imposes upon Members the obligation to use 
international standards as the foundation for regulatory practices, while leaving 
a margin of discretion as to the choice of measure and its use.8 The relevant 
provision is found in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. It reads: 
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards 
exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant 
parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such 
international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, 
for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or 
fundamental technological problems.9 
This provision was called upon in four disputes that have been adjudicated 
within the WTO Dispute Settlement System.10 Based on this jurisprudence, a 
6 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature 15 
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘Marrakesh Agreement’). 
7 Ibid annex 1A (‘Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods’). 
8 Cf Erik Wijkstrom and Devin McDaniels, ‘International Standards and the WTO TBT 
Agreement: Improving Governance for Regulatory Alignment’ (Staff Working Paper ERSD, 
World Trade Organization, 2013) 3.  
9 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, opened for signature 12 April 1979, 1186 UNTS 
276 (entered into force 1 January 1980) art 2.4. 
10 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002); Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012); Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of 
Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc WT/DS384/386/AB/R (29 June 2012).  
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three-step test11 was established to determine compliance with Article 2.4 of 
the TBT Agreement. As a result, for a measure to be in compliance with Article 
2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the respondent party must demonstrate that the 
regulation at stake was based on an international standard. This will be so in 
cases where the regulation a) used a relevant international standard b) as its 
basis and the standard is c) appropriate to and effective in the attainment of a 
legitimate aim. 
 
Figure 1: WTO Minimum Standard of Review for International Standards 
Source: Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), [7.627]. 
As the above figure shows, the identified compliance test for Article 2.4 of the 
TBT Agreement requires the completion of three steps to establish a non-
violation of the TBT Agreement. These steps will be discussed in detail as 
follows.  
1 The Relevant International Standard 
The WTO Appellate Body first addressed the concept of ‘relevant’ international 
standards in EC – Sardines.12 In that case, a European regulation controlling 
the labelling and marketing requirements of preserved sardines was challenged 
by Peru under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. This measure allowed for the 
marketing and labelling of products prepared from a specific (European) 
11 Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc WT/DS381/R (15 September 2011) [7.627]. 
12 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002). 
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species of sardines13 to the exclusion of products prepared from other 
(Peruvian) species of sardines.14  
The WTO Appellate Body based its findings on an analysis of the ‘relevance’ 
of an international standard for canned sardines and sardine-type products in 
the light of the standard Codex Stan 94, drafted by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission.15 Concurring with the conclusion reached by the WTO Panel 
Report,16 the Appellate Body held that the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘relevant’ is ‘bearing upon or relating to the matter in hand; pertinent’.17  
It then followed that, in the case at hand, for Codex Stan 94 to be a relevant 
international standard, it had to bear upon, relate to, or be pertinent to the EC 
regulation challenged.18 Because the challenged measure dealt with the same 
product as the Codex Stan 94 and included the provisions set out in the Codex 
Stan 94, it was found that the CAC standard in question provided sufficient 
basis to be considered a ‘relevant international standard’ in that case.19  
This reasoning was upheld in US – Tuna II (Mexico), where Mexico challenged 
a US regulation establishing the conditions for use of a ‘dolphin-safe’ label on 
tuna products. The Appellate Body was called upon to assess whether the 
dolphin-safe definition and certification standards defined by the Agreement on 
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCO), which establish 
dolphin mortality limits, specific fishing techniques, and fishing gear to reduce 
dolphin by-catch, constituted a relevant international standard.  
In that case, however, the ‘relevant international standard’ for the purposes of 
the TBT Agreement was identified in accordance with the characteristics of the 
standard-setting body. Based on an interpretation of the definition of ‘standard’ 
13 The European Sardina Pichardus. 
14 The Peruvian Sardinops Sagax.  
15 Codex Alimentarius Commission [CAC] as established by the Joint FAO/WHO Conference 
on Food Standards, ALINORM 62/8 (1–5 October 1962). 
16 Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/R (29 May 2002) [7.68], quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary (William 
Collins & World Publishing Co, Inc, 1976) 1199. 
17 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) [231]–[232]. 
18 Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/R (29 May 2002) [7.68].  
19 Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/R (29 May 2002) [7.69]. 
                                                 
222 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 2 
set out in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement20 and its explanatory note,21 the 
Appellate Body stated that an international standardising body is ‘a body that 
has recognised activities in standardisation and whose membership is open to 
the relevant bodies of all WTO Members’.22 It further elaborated on the concept 
of, and set out three requirements for, membership openness: there should be 
(i) no restrictions on membership by WTO members;23 (ii) automatic 
accession;24 and (iii) openness at all stages of standard development, to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.25 After carrying out a legal assessment, the 
Appellate Body concluded that AIDCO standards could not be deemed as 
‘relevant international standards’ for the purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement.26 The organisation did not qualify as an ‘international 
standardisation body’ because accession was by invitation only, which in turn 
had to be extended by consensus among Members. Hence, the membership 
openness requirement, which imposes a prohibition on the restriction of 
membership by WTO members, was not fulfilled by AIDCO, leading to the 
violation of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. 
Another case addressing the importance of the relevant international standard 
was US – Clove Cigarettes.27 In this case, Indonesia challenged a US measure 
banning the production and sale of cigarettes with flavours other than tobacco 
or menthol. Although the challenge was not brought under Article 2.4 of the 
TBT Agreement,28 the Panel stated that it was aware of the existence of 
international standards to curb smoking within the WHO Framework 
20 According to which a standard is: ‘[a] [d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that 
provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may 
also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method’: Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, opened for signature 12 April 1979, 1186 UNTS 276 (entered into 
force 1 January 1980) Annex 1, para 2. 
21 Ibid, whereby ‘standards are defined as voluntary (…) documents. Standards prepared by the 
international standardization community are based on consensus.’ 
22 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012) [359]. 
23 Ibid [364]. 
24 Ibid [386]. 
25 Ibid [374]. 
26 Ibid [401]. 
27 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, WTO Doc WT/DS406/AB/R (4 April 2012). 
28 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 
WTO Doc WT/DS406/R (4 April 2012) [7.496]. 
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Convention on Tobacco Control.29 The fact that the Panel decided to mention 
its awareness of international standardisation tendencies, even though no 
formal challenge had been brought against a measure based on an international 
standard, demonstrates once again the relevance of the standardisation process 
at the global level. 
2 International Standards as a Basis for Regulation 
The question of whether a relevant international standard has been used as a 
basis for regulation was addressed in EC – Sardines.30 In that case, the 
Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that an international standard is used ‘as 
a basis for’31 a technical regulation when it is used as a principal constituent, or 
fundamental principle, in enacting that technical regulation. It further stated that 
there must be a ‘very strong and very close relationship’32 between the 
challenged measure and the invoked international standard for the latter to 
constitute a basis for the former.  
The Appellate Body continued to lay down, as the minimum standard of 
connection between the measure and the standard, the lack of contradiction 
between them. In the words of the Appellate Body: 
[I]t can certainly be said — at a minimum — that something cannot be 
considered a “basis” for something else if the two are contradictory. 
Therefore, under Article 2.4, if the technical regulation and the international 
standard contradict each other, it cannot properly be concluded that the 
international standard has been used “as a basis for” the technical 
regulation.33 
While construing this interpretation, the Appellate Body deemed it relevant to 
refer to its approach in interpreting the term ‘based on’ in the context of Article 
3.1 of the SPS Agreement.34 This provision establishes a presumption of 
compliance with the SPS Agreement, in cases where the challenged measure is 
based on international (food) standards, designed and adopted by the CAC. 
29 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, opened for signature 21 May 2003, 2302 
UNTS 116 (entered into force 27 February 2005). 
30 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002). 
31 Ibid [240]–[244]. 
32 Ibid [245]. 
33 Ibid [248]. 
34 Ibid [242]. 
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Following this line, the TBT Agreement and its interpretative jurisprudence 
lend themselves to establish a presumption of compliance, whereby technical 
regulations are presumed not to be trade-distorting if adopted in accordance 
with a relevant international standard.35 In contrast to the SPS Agreement, 
however, where reference is made to specific standard-setting bodies, the TBT 
Agreement offers a greater margin of discretion in choosing the relevant 
international standardisation body and its standards as a basis for a WTO 
compliant measure.  
3 Effectiveness and Appropriateness in Attaining a 
Legitimate Aim 
The implicit obligations of WTO Members to base their TBT measures on 
relevant international standards can be avoided only in cases where their use 
would lead to a level of protection which is inappropriate to, or ineffective in, 
the fulfilment of their legitimate objectives. 
To determine the concept of ‘effectiveness’, the Appellate Body upheld the 
interpretation given by the Panel in EC - Sardines, whereby the term 
‘ineffective’ refers to something that does not have the ‘function of 
accomplishing’ or have ‘a result’ or something that is not ‘brought to bear’;36 
and the term ‘inappropriate’ refers to something that is not ‘specially suitable’, 
‘proper’ or ‘fitting’ for the achievement of a legitimate objective.37 The 
Appellate Body further agreed on the statement made by the Panel that these 
two terms have different meanings, stating that ‘it is conceptually possible that 
a measure could be effective but inappropriate, or appropriate but ineffective’.38 
In other words, both requirements must be cumulatively fulfilled for a measure 
to be compliant with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. Later, the Panel Report 
on US – Tuna II (Mexico) recalled this precedence while establishing that 
Mexico bore the burden of showing that the AIDCP standard is both effective 
and appropriate.39 
35 Wijkstrom and McDaniels, above n 8, 14. 
36 Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/R (29 May 2002) [7.116]. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) [289]. 
39 Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc WT/DS381/R (15 September 2011) [7.725]. 
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In US – COOL,40 the Appellate Body defined the concept of ‘legitimate 
objectives’ while assessing whether certain US requirements for labelling meat 
products were in compliance with TBT obligations. In that case, it 
acknowledged the legitimacy of a US measure requiring the disclosure of 
country of origin information in the labelling of meat products, the disclosure 
being intended to inform consumers ‘on the countries in which the livestock 
from which the meat they purchase is produced were born, raised and 
slaughtered’.41 However, the costs associated with the implementation of that 
measure, a measure which did not necessarily translate into additional 
information being provided to consumers, would de facto lead to an exclusive 
use of domestic livestock by US producers and ‘thus [had] a detrimental impact 
on the competitive opportunities of imported livestock’.42 Hence, an approach 
is necessary which balances the sovereign right of WTO members to adopt 
domestic measures against their right to trade in another WTO member’s 
market.  
III INTERNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTING ORGANISATIONS 
The previous section showed that standard-setting organisations with 
international dimensions, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), 
play a fundamental role in providing the tools for assessing the WTO 
compatibility of domestic regulation. This holds true for food safety and quality 
standards as well. While the CAC is the leading standard-setting body for food 
safety, the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO), with its 
comprehensive set of standards, has also acquired an important role in the 
regulation of food quality. Although there exist other relevant standard-setting 
organisations with their own internal dispute settlement mechanisms43 for 
animal health and zoonoses44 as well as for plant health,45 this part will not deal 
with them.46  
40 Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, WTO Doc WT/DS384/386/AB/R (29 June 2012). 
41 Ibid [453]. 
42 Ibid [349]. 
43 Marina Foltea, International Organizations in WTO Dispute Settlement: How Much 
Sensitivity? (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 157. 
44 Such as the International Office of Epizootics [OIE]. 
45 Such as the International Plant Protection Convention [IPPC]. 
46 For a short overview of the IPPC and the OIE see Terence Stewart and David Johanson, ‘The 
SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organisation and Interntional Organisations: The Roles of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection Convention and the 
International Office of Epizootics’ (1998) 26 Syracuse Journal of International Law 27. 
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In spite of their voluntary nature, the standards designed by relevant 
international standard-setting bodies have achieved a high and sometimes 
disputed legal status. This is due in some instances to their explicit mention in 
WTO instruments — as is the case with the CAC in the SPS Agreement47 — 
and in other instances to their use in agreement interpretation by the WTO 
dispute settlement system, as is the case with ISO standards.48 Hence, this part 
aims at analysing the legal mechanisms of the CAC and the ISO, addressing 
their rules of procedure, development and adoption of standards.  
A Codex Alimentarius Commission 
1 The Objectives and Nature of the CAC 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is the most influential food standard-
setting body at the international level.49 Its main objective is to set international 
food standards for the protection of public health and the promotion of fair 
practice in food trade.50 Unlike more recent WTO instruments, the CAC was 
established in 1962 by the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme as 
their subsidiary body to respond to the increased trade in food.51 It elaborates 
on international standards, codes of practice, guidelines and related texts 
addressing food safety and quality with a view to facilitating international 
trade.52 For many decades, the legal relevance of CAC standards was dismissed 
because of their non-binding nature, and merely advisory role.53 It was only 
47 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 493 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex A. 
48 Cf Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO 
Doc WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) and Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012).  
49 Other international institutions also devote their work to setting standards in the area of food 
safety, eg, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
50 CAC Procedural Manual (World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 19th ed, 2010) (‘CAC Procedural Manual’) arts 1(c), (d) 
and (e), 
51 As a subsidiary organ, the CAC depends financially and institutionally on the FAO and the 
WHO, a dependence which impairs its ability to rapidly and effectively adopt standards.  
52 CAC, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius (World Health Organization and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 3rd ed, 2006). 
53 Prior to the adoption of the SPS Agreement, CAC standards were binding only when 
voluntarily transposed into national legislation and thus they remained untouched by national 
or international political interests. See generally: Matthias Herdegen, ‘Biotechnology and 
Regulatory Risk Assessment’ in George Bermann, Matthias Herdegen and Peter Lindseth (eds), 
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects (Oxford 
                                                 
2014 INTERNATIONAL FOOD STANDARDS AND WTO LAW 227 
upon the adoption of the WTO Agreements that the Codex Alimentarius was 
upgraded to semi-binding status.54 The SPS Agreement in its Articles 3.455 and 
12.356 explicitly refers to the adoption of the CAC standards as a way to sustain 
a presumption of compliance with food safety rules. 
Whether the CAC standards are binding in nature has been intensely debated 
among legal scholars, without consensus being reached.57 The findings of the 
WTO Appellate Body in EC – Hormones 58 explicitly rejected the argument 
that international standards should be accorded binding force. It stated: 
We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon 
themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation by 
mandating conformity or compliance with such [international] standards (…).To 
sustain such an assumption and to warrant such a far-reaching interpretation, treaty 
language far more specific and compelling than that found in Article 3 of the SPS 
Agreement would be necessary.59 
Fifteen years after these findings, the de facto binding nature of CAC standards 
still continues to be questioned.60 It has even prompted debate on the legitimacy 
University Press, 2001) 301–17; Frode Veggeland and Svein Borgen, Changing the Codex: The 
Role of International Institutions (Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 
2002). 
54 Cf Alessandra Arcuri, The Coproduction of the Global Regulatory Regime for Food Safety 
Standards and the Limits of a Technocratic Ethos (RSCAS Working Paper, European 
University Institute 2014/97) 3; Veggeland and Svein Ole Borgen, ‘Negotiating International 
Food Standards: The World Trade Organisation’s Impact on the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission’ (2005) 18(4) Governance 675–708. 
55 Art 3.4 of the SPS Agreement reads: ‘Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their 
resources, in the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission … to promote within these organizations the development 
and periodic review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects 
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.’ 
56 Art 12.3 of the SPS Agreement reads: ‘The Committee shall maintain close contact with the 
relevant international organizations in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, 
especially with the Codex Alimentarius Commission … with the objective of securing the best 
available scientific and technical advice for the administration of this Agreement.’ 
57 Rejecting the binding nature of CAC standards, see Joanne Scott, ‘International Trade and 
Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO’, (2004) 
15(2) European Journal of International Law 307–54; Reinhard Quick and Andreas Blunther, 
‘Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO 
Hormones Case’ (1999) 2(4) Journal of International Economic Law 603–39. 
58 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R (16 January 1998) (‘EC-Hormones’) [162]–[165]. 
59 Ibid [165]. 
60 Illustrating the current discussion on the binding force of CAC standards, see Marielle Matthee, 
‘The Codex Alimentarius Commission and its Food Safety Measures in the Light of their New 
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and transparency of the adoption process used by the CAC.61 In particular, it is 
asked whether the lengthy adoption process and the rapid development of new 
technologies affecting food production are hindering the harmonisation task 
with which this institution has been entrusted.62  
As shown in recent WTO case law, however, concerns about procedural 
transparency and legitimacy should not distract from the semi-binding nature 
of CAC standards. A joint analysis of EC – Hormones,63 which specifically 
rejected the binding nature of CAC standards in the context of the SPS 
Agreement, and of the compliance test designed by the Appellate Body in EC 
– Sardines64 for the TBT Agreement leads to the conclusion that WTO law 
provides legal flexibilities in its provisions sufficient to allow CAC standards 
to create a prima facie presumption of compliance with WTO obligations. 
2 The CAC Rules of Procedure 
CAC Membership is open to all WHO and FAO Members. It is led by an 
executive committee, consisting of the Chair of the Commission, three Vice-
chairs, Coordinators appointed by the Commission for certain regions or group 
of countries, and seven members, one each for Africa, Asia, Europe, the Near 
East, North America, the South-West Pacific, and Latin America and the 
Status’ in Michelle Everson and Ellen Vos (eds), Uncertain Risks Regulated, (Routledge 
Cavendish Publishing, 2009) 325–9. 
61 The legitimacy of the CAC to adopt international standards remains questioned. See inter alia: 
Henrik Horn and Joseph Weiler, ‘European Communities — Trade Description of Sardines: 
Textualism and its Discontent’ in Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis (eds), The WTO Case Law 
of 2002 (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 248–75; Sidney Shapiro, ‘International Trade 
Agreements, Regulatory Protection and Public Accountability’ (2002) 54(1) Administrative 
Law Review 435–57. Likewise, transparency concerns are still being discussed among CAC 
Members. See, inter alia, CAC (FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme), Report of the Twenty-
Second Session of the Codex Committee on General Principles, ALINORM 05/28/33A (11–15 
April 2005) [98]–[105]; CAC (FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme), Report of the 
Nineteenth (Extraordinary) Session of the Codex Committee on General Principles, ALINORM 
04/27/33 (17–21 November 2003) [40]–[45]. 
62 Regretting the increased politicisation of internal mechanisms of standard adoption, see 
Alberto Alemanno, Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the 
WTO (Cameron May Publishing, 2007) 273–4 (‘Alemanno’). 
63 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R (16 January 1998) (‘EC-Hormones’). 
64 Also, Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012); 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, WTO Doc WT/DS406/AB/R (4 April 2012).  
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Caribbean. The Executive Committee meets annually as well as before each 
Commission session.65 
The CAC Secretariat is based in Rome, at FAO headquarters. It provides 
administrative support for the organisation of the sessions and the coordination 
of the work carried out by subsidiary bodies to the Codex.66 The CAC functions 
according to its Procedural Manual, which is composed of the Codex Statutes 
and the Rules of Procedure. The Manual sets up rules for membership, the 
appointment and responsibilities of officers, the frequency and operation of 
Codex sessions, voting procedure, and the preparation of records, reports and 
budget allocations.67 
In practice decisions are adopted by consensus, although de jure the Rules of 
Procedure require that they be carried by a majority of votes. Senior officials 
appointed by their respective governments form the delegations that represent 
each Member State, which has one vote. Observers, and those granted observer 
status (such as representatives of the industry, consumer associations and 
international academic institutes) are allowed to participate in the decision-
making process, without a vote.  
3 The Development of CAC Standards 
The standards developed by the CAC address processed, semi-processed and 
raw food. They also contain numerous maximum residue limits for pesticides 
in foods and animal feed, residue levels for veterinary drugs in foods of animal 
origin, and acceptable levels of food additives and contaminants.68 The 
preparation of these standards takes place in Codex Committees. These 
Committees are of two types: Commodity Committees and General Subject 
Committees. 
Commodity Committees develop vertical standards on food quality. Their 
subject matter includes fresh fruit and vegetables, processed meat and poultry 
products. Some of these Committees have already completed their work and 
are now inactive for an unspecified period of time, while others are kept active 
65 CAC, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, above n 52, 15; Jessica Vapnek and Melvin 
Spreij, Perspectives and Guidelines on Food Legislation: With a New Model Food Law (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation, 2005) 30. 
66 CAC, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, above n 52, 19; Vapnek and Spreij, above n 65, 
31. 
67 CAC, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, above n 52, 14; Vapnek and Spreij, above n 65, 
30. 
68 CAC, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, above n 52, 11; Vapnek and Spreij, above n 65, 
31. 
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to review and align standards with current practice. This in turn has resulted in 
a loss of prominence for Commodity Committees in favour of the General 
Subjects Committees which develop horizontal safety standards.69 General 
Subjects Committees develop principles applicable horizontally to all, or a 
specific group of, food products, while developing recommendations on 
consumer health and safety. These Committees generally rely on independent 
expert advice to design and develop food standards.70 
4 The Adoption of CAC Standards 
 
The CAC develops and adopts standards according to its strategic six-year plan, 
which acts as a benchmark for submitted individual proposals. The strategic 
plan is reviewed every two years in order to adjust to current demands. The 
Executive Committee critically reviews new proposals for standards in order to 
ensure their development within a reasonable period of time, based on the 
requirements and availability of expert scientific advice. This decision-making 
process represents collective policy action and multilateral cooperation through 
the joint activities of the FAO and WHO, which ultimately aim at attaining high 
levels of consumer protection, public health and food safety.71 With a view to 
making the adoption of Codex standards more inclusive, transparent and, 
ultimately, more effective, a joint FAO/WHO/CAC evaluation was carried out 
in 2002. As a result of this, the Codex Commission adopted several 
amendments to its rules of procedure.72 
The number of international food standards, guidelines and recommendations 
adopted by the CAC that have been implemented in domestic legislation has 
dramatically increased. This change is due mainly to two interrelated factors. 
On the one hand it results from the recognition of the Codex Alimentarius as 
the main source of food safety standards in the SPS Agreement.73 On the other 
hand, the Codex Alimentarius gained importance by being indirectly 
recognised as an international standard-setting organisation by the TBT 
69 CAC, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, above n 52, 17–18; Vapnek and Spreij, above n 
65, 33. 
70 CAC, Understanding The Codex Alimentarius, above n 52, 17–18; Vapnek and Spreij, above 
n 65, 30. 
71 World Health Organization, Global Strategy for Food Safety (2002) <http://whqlibdoc.who. 
int/publications/9241545747.pdf>. 
72 CAC (FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme), Report of the Twenty-Eighth Session of the 
Codex Committee on Processed Fruits and Vegetables, ALINORM 05/28/27 (4 to 9 July 2005). 
73 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
Chapter 6, ‘Food Safety Standards as Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ (no date) 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tafta/tafta_chapter_6.html>. 
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Agreement.74 The resulting reinforcement of legitimacy is tangible. Whereas 
the first thirty years of the Codex’s existence were characterised by the adoption 
of standards largely implemented in developing countries seeking access to 
major markets, the last decade saw a significant increase in the Codex’s profile 
among developed countries.75 Ultimately, it is the promotion of policy 
cooperation and regulatory harmonisation76 required to overcome global trade 
barriers that underlies the success of the CAC. 
B The International Standardization Organization 
The ISO was created during a conference at the Institute of Civil Engineers 
in London in 1946 to facilitate the international coordination and unification 
of industrial standards.77 It was the result of combining two already existing 
standard-setting organizations:78 the International Federation of the 
National Standardizing Associations (ISA)79 and the United Nations 
Standards Coordinating Committee (UNSCC).80 The main objective of the 
ISO is to promote the development of standardisation worldwide, and so 
facilitate the international exchange of goods.81 
1 ISO Membership 
Unlike the CAC, the ISO is a non-governmental organisation with members 
from 162 countries, which draw solely from their respective national standards 
74 Annex A to the TBT Agreement; Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade 
Description of Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) [221]. 
75 Michael Livermore, ‘Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, 
Institutional Differentiation and the Codex Alimentarius’ (2006) 81 New York University Law 
Review 766. 
76 CAC (FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme), Report of the Twenty-Third Session of the 
Codex Committee on Methods of Analysis and Sampling, ALINORM 01/23 (2–7 July 2001) 
[12].  
77 Vapnek and Spreij, above n 65, 44. 
78 International Organization for Standardization, Friendship among Equals: Recollection from 
ISO’s First Fifty Years (ISO, 1997) 15. 
79 The International Federation of the National Standardizing Associations (ISA) was created in 
New York in 1926. 
80 The United Nations Standards Coordinating Committee (UNSCC) was created in London in 
1944. 
81 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Statutes (2013) <http://www. 
iso.org/iso/statutes.pdf>, 2.1. 
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bodies.82 Members can delegate their rights and obligations to other 
organisations, but they remain responsible to the other members.83 However, 
membership is limited to one institution (private or public) per country;84 
whichever represents the standardisation practices of that country best. The ISO 
has three types of membership: full member bodies, correspondent members 
and subscriber members. These member categories enjoy different levels of 
access and influence over the ISO system. The type of membership that a 
country has is determined by its Gross National Income and trade figures, 
factors which also determine the fees that it is called upon to pay.85  
ISO Members meet annually at a General Assembly, which deals with 
proposals from the ISO Council, which in turn meets twice a year. The 
membership of the ISO Council is based on a yearly rotation to ensure an even 
representation of all the ISO members. Operational matters related to the day-
to-day functioning of the organisation are dealt with by a permanent Secretary-
General reporting to the ISO President, whose term lasts two years.  
2 The Development and Adoption of ISO Standards 
The ISO develops new standards on the basis of proposals by its Members 
during the General Assembly.86 Once a proposal is adopted, the relevant 
Technical Committee, composed of experts from industrial, business and 
technical sectors and put forward by ISO members, develops the required 
standard. The ISO has over 250 technical committees, all of them answering to 
three additional General Policy Development Committees.87  
ISO standards are entirely voluntary in nature. Due to high levels of 
implementation in national legal systems, however, they are invested with a de 
82 Ibid 3.3. The recent, 2012, modification in ISO membership rules reflects a much-needed 
change in internal policy, whereby no bodies other than the national standard bodies may be 
eligible for ISO membership. 
83 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Membership Manual (August 2013) 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_ membership_ manual_2013.pdf>, 17.  
84 International Organization for Standardization, Friendship among Equals: Recollection from 
ISO’s First Fifty Years (ISO, 1997) 3.2. 
85 International Organization for Standardization, ISO, Structure and Governance (no date) 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/about_governance.htm>. 
86 The ISO standard-setting process available on the Internet addresses only six, instead of eight, 
steps: International Organization for Standardization, Developing ISO Standards (no date) 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/resources-for-technical-work/ 
support-for-developing-standards.htm >.  
87 International Organization for Standardization, Who Develops ISO Standards? (no date) 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/who-develops-iso-standards.htm>. 
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facto mandatory nature that heightens their relevance to market access. The 
recently developed ISO 22000 standards on Food Safety Management are 
particularly important for trade in foodstuffs.88 These standards lay down the 
necessary requirements for the correct implementation of all food safety 
management systems along the supply chain; compliance with them 
demonstrates an organisation’s ability to control food safety hazards.89 These 
standards are complemented by three ISO Technical Specifications: the ISO 
Technical Specification 22004, which aims at giving implementation guidance 
to the ISO 22000:2005;90 the ISO Technical Specification 22003:2013, which 
defines the rules applicable for the audit and certification of a food management 
system;91 and ISO Technical Specifications 22002-1/4:2013, which specifies 
the requirements for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of 
prerequisite programmes to assist in controlling food safety hazards.92 Finally, 
ISO Standard 22005:2007, concerning traceability in the feed and food chain, 
establishes the general principles and basic requirements for system design and 
implementation.93 This is the latest international food standard adopted by the 
ISO General Principles and Guidance for System Design and Development.  
As is the case with the CAC standards, the number of international food 
standards adopted by the ISO has increased dramatically to over 1000 to date.94 
This growth has led to an elevated status, which is justified by the direct 
88 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 22000, Food Safety Management Systems 
– Requirements for Any Organization on the Food Chain (no date) <http://www.iso. 
org/iso/ home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_ detail.htm?csnumber=35466>. 
89 They include feed producers, primary producers, food manufacturers, transport and storage 
operators, retail and food service establishments, producers of equipment, packaging material, 
additives and ingredients.  
90 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Technical Specification ISO/TS 
22004:2005 – Food Safety Management Systems: Guidance on the Application of ISO 
22000:2005 (no date) <http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=39835>.  
91 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Technical Specification ISO/TS 
22003:2013, Food Safety Management Systems: Requirements for Bodies providing Audit and 
Certification of Food Safety Management Systems (no date) <http://www.iso.org 
/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=60605>.  
92 International Organization for Standardization , ISO Technical Specification ISO/TS 22002-
1/4:2009, Prerequisites Programmes for Food Safety: Catering, Food Manufacturing, Farming 
and Food Packaging Manufacturing (no date) <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/ 
catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber = 44001>. 
93 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Technical Specification ISO 22005: 2007, 
Traceability in the Feed and Food Chain: General Principles and Basic Requirements for 
System Design and Implementation (no date) <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/ 
catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=36297>.  
94 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Standards and Food: Quality and Safety 
from Farm to Fork (January 2012) <http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_and_ food.pdf>. 
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recognition of the ISO as a relevant international standard-setting organisation 
in the TBT Agreement. Indeed, according to Article 4.1 of the TBT Agreement, 
WTO Members must ensure that their national standard bodies comply with the 
Code of Good Practice, which is in turn an ISO product.95 The resulting 
reinforcement of legitimacy is also evident in the recent amendment of the ISO 
Statutes, establishing that only national standards bodies can become members. 
Given that international standards are effective only after being implemented at 
their respective domestic levels, the impact of national standards bodies in 
ensuring harmonisation is evident.  
IV THE CURIOUS CASE OF PRIVATE FOOD STANDARDS 
AND WTO LAW 
The last decade has seen an increase in the use of standards solely designed and 
adopted by private players. Much has been written about the challenges that 
they pose for international trade.96 These standards are developed not by 
domestic policy-makers or international organisations, but are primarily 
designed by large supermarket chains in a bid to ensure the quality and safety 
of their retail products.97 The contractual obligation owed by the supplier to 
comply with a set of specific standards undoubtedly has a binding effect from 
the private law perspective. In developing a specified set of (food) standards, 
suppliers have to commit to complying with them in order to avoid a breach of 
contract. It has therefore been claimed that their voluntary nature becomes de 
facto mandatory.98  
95 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, opened for signature 12 April 1979, 1186 UNTS 
276 (entered into force 1 January 1980) annex 3 (‘Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards’). 
96 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Final Report on Private Standards 
and the Shaping of Agro-Food Systems’, Paris (2006). See also: Steve Jaffe and Olivier 
Masakure, ‘Strategic Use of Private Standards to Enhance International Competitiveness: 
Vegetable Exports from Kenya and Elsewhere’ (2005) 30 Food Policy 316–33; Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Private Standards Schemes and Developing 
Countries Access to Global Value Chains: Challenges and Opportunities Emerging from Four 
Case Studies’, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/final, Paris, (2007); Tetty Havinga, ‘Private Regulation 
of Food Safety by Supermarkets’ (2006) 28(4) Law and Policy, 515–33; Lawrence Busch, ‘The 
Moral Economic of Grades and Standards’ (2000) 16 Journal of Rural Studies 273–83. 
97 Doris Fuchs, Agni Kalfagianni and Tetty Havinga, ‘Actors in Private Food Governance: The 
Legitimacy of Retail Standards and Multi stakeholders Initiatives with Civil Society 
Participation’ (2009) 28 Agricultural Human Values 353–67. 
98 Ibid; Spencer Henson and Thomas Reardon, ‘Private Agri-Food Standards: Implications for 
Food Policy and the Agri-Food System’ (2005) 30 Food Policy 241–53. 
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From a public international law perspective, however the proliferation of 
private voluntary food standards poses important challenges to the correct 
application of the WTO rules in particular. This is so due to the assumed fact 
that private parties, such as supermarket chains, are not subjects of international 
law and therefore obligations arising out of the Marrakesh Agreements do not 
apply to them. Jurisdictional objections aside, trade concerns have been raised 
in WTO fora about the implications of private parties imposing, in their cross-
border contracts, compliance with voluntary standards that go beyond the level 
of protection offered by domestic, WTO-compliant regulation. The question 
that remains open is whether the WTO Agreements, particularly the SPS 
Agreement, have sufficient flexibility to address the legal implications of 
private voluntary safety standards and so diminish the trade-distorting effects, 
such as compliance costs and import discrimination,99 attributed to them. 
A Private Food Standard-Setting Entities  
It has been claimed that the recent development of standard setting by private 
entities has both positive and negative implications for international trade. Such 
standards are trade-enhancing because they can contribute to product 
differentiation, improve quality and safety, disseminate modern and efficient 
technologies, and ultimately guarantee market access. They are trade-distorting 
because they disguise protectionist measures, artificially fragment markets, 
impose unreasonable requirements on suppliers, and thus restrict market access. 
Five key private standard-setting bodies have been identified as the major 
driving forces behind the proliferation of private food safety standards: the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (‘GFSI’), the Global Partnership for Good 
Agricultural Practices (‘GlobalGAP’), Safe Quality Food (‘SQF’), the 
International Food Standard (‘IFS’) and the British Retail Consortium (‘BRC’).  
The GFSI was initiated in 2000 by a group of international retailers in order to 
agree on a globally accepted food safety benchmark. It sets baseline 
requirements for food safety standards and aims to improve efficiency costs 
throughout the food supply chain. Its central aim is to strengthen consumer 
confidence in food bought in retail outlets.100  
GlobalGAP was first developed in 1997 as EurepGAP by a group of European 
retailers; since 2007 it has been known as GlobalGAP. Its standards initially 
applied to fruit and vegetables only, but now also cover meat products and fish 
99 Steven Jaffe and Spencer Henson, Standards and Agro-Food Exports from Developing 
Countries: Rebalancing the Debate (World Bank Policy Research Paper 3348, June 2004) 3. 
100 Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Havinga, above n 97. 
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from aquaculture. Compliance with its standards requires the completion of a 
checklist consisting of 254 questions to obtain certification.  
SQF was developed in 1994 by the Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture and sold to the US in 2003. It is a food safety and quality program 
for primary production and for food manufacturing and distribution. It is now 
owned by the US Food Marketing Institute, whose membership represents 
three-quarters of American food retailers and 200 companies from over 50 
countries.101  
The IFS was initiated in 2002 by German food retailers. A year later the French 
Food Retailers’ association joined, followed by the Italian Food Retailers’ 
Association. Retailers from Austria, Poland, Spain and Switzerland also 
adopted the IFS food safety standard. This standard deals with the processing 
of food and contains 250 requirements divided into the areas of production 
processes, management responsibility, quality management systems, resource 
management, measurements and improvements, and audit protocol.102  
The BRC was created in 1998 to evaluate the manufacturing of retailers’ own 
brand products. It delineates more than 250 requirements including 
comprehensive norms for food safety and quality schemes, products and 
process management, and the personnel’s personal hygiene.103 
The number of what are considered private standard-setting entities continues 
to grow. While the line between entities embedded in public or private law is 
often blurred, this Part does not attempt to examine the legal nature of the 
standard-setting entities. Rather, it focuses on the products produced, that is, 
the private food standard, which is currently under the scrutiny of the SPS 
Committee.  
B Discussion of Private Standards in the SPS 
Committee 
The private voluntary food standards described above have raised concerns 
among the governments of least developing and developing nations within the 
WTO. Although private food standards extend to both quality and safety, it is 
safety standards which have received the most attention. In particular, the SPS 
Committee was called upon to establish a working group in order to tackle the 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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issue of whether private safety standards fall within the scope of the SPS 
Agreement. 
The first concerns were raised by St Vincent and the Grenadines in 2005, whose 
government complained about the additional requirements set by EurepGap for 
exporting bananas to the United Kingdom.104 Supported, among others, by 
Ecuador105 and Argentina,106 St Vincent and the Grenadines complained that 
these additional private food standards are more stringent than the public 
mandatory food standards that are in place. 
As a response to these concerns, the SPS Committee agreed to undertake a 
three-step comparative study on the effects of private SPS standards. As a first 
step, the Secretariat circulated a questionnaire about SPS-related private 
standards in 2008.107 A second step saw the circulation in 2009 of a descriptive 
report summarising the information contained in the 40 responses obtained 
from 22 Members.108 As the third and last step the Secretariat then prepared an 
analytical report identifying possible actions.109 The proposed 
recommendations were amended after a discussion between the ad hoc working 
group on private standards and the SPS Committee, and a revised version of the 
recommendations was circulated in March 2010.110 After the ad hoc working 
group meeting, a second revised version of the recommendations was 
circulated.111 A couple of months later, a third revision of the recommendation 
was issued.112 
104 Private Industry Standards, WTO Doc G/SPS/GEN/766 (28 February 2007), Communication 
from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.  
105 Private and Commercial Standards, WTO Doc G/SPS/GEN/792 (5 July 2007), Statement by 
Ecuador at the Meeting of 27–28 June 2007. 
106 Private Standards and the SPS Agreement, WTO Doc G/SPS/W/746 (24 January 2007), Note 
by the Secretariat. 
107 Questionnaire on SPS-Related Private Standards, WTO Doc G/SPS/W/232 (8 December 
2008), Note by the Secretariat. 
108 Effects of SPS-Related Private Standards: Descriptive Report, WTO Doc G/SPS/GEN/932 
(15 June 2009), Note by the Secretariat. 
109 Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding Private SPS Standards, WTO Doc 
G/SPS/W/247 (20 October 2009), Note by the Secretariat. 
110 Possible Actions for the SPS Committee regarding Private SPS Standards, WTO Doc 
G/SPS/W/247/Rev.1 (5 March 2010), Note by the Secretariat – Revision No.1. 
111 Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards, WTO 
Doc G/SPS/W/247/Rev.2 (15 June 2010), Note by the Secretariat – Revision No. 2. 
112 Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards, WTO 
Doc G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3 (11 October 2010), Note by the Secretariat – Revision No. 3. 
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In March 2011, six actions were proposed to the SPS Committee by the ad hoc 
working group on SPS-related private standards.113 At its meeting on 20–31 
March 2011, the SPS Committee adopted five of the six actions put forward:  
Action 1: The SPS Committee should develop a working definition of SPS-
related private standards and limit any discussions to these. … 
Action 2: The SPS Committee should regularly inform Codex, OIE and IPPC 
regarding relevant developments in its considerations of SPS-related private 
standards, and should invite these organizations to likewise regularly inform 
the SPS Committee of relevant developments in their respective bodies. … 
Action 3: The SPS Committee invites the Secretariat to inform the Committee 
on developments in other WTO fora which could be of relevance for its 
discussions on SPS-related private standards. … 
Action 4: Members are encouraged to communicate with entities involved in 
SPS-related private standards in their territories to sensitize them to the issues 
raised in the SPS Committee and underline the importance of international 
standards established by the Codex, OIE and IPPC. … 
Action 5: The SPS Committee should explore the possibility of working with 
the Codex, OIE and IPPC to support the development and/or dissemination 
of informative materials underlining the importance of international SPS 
standards.114   
Since then, the SPS Committee has been working on addressing Action 1, 
namely establishing a working definition of SPS-related private standards.115 
While New Zealand and China have managed to produce a draft definition of 
private SPS standards,116 Members remain deadlocked. As of March 2014,117 
the SPS Committee has entrusted the Secretariat with the compilation of 
relevant information on the definition of private standards within other 
international standard-setting bodies. This data was discussed in the SPS 
113 Report of the ad hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private Standards to the SPS Committee, 
WTO Doc G/SPS/W/256 (3 March 2011). 
114 Actions Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards, WTO Doc G/SPS/55 (6 April 2011), 
Decision of the Committee 1–3. 
115 ‘Proposed Working Definition of SPS-Related Private Standards’, WTO Doc G/SPS/W/265 
(6 March 2012), Note by the Secretariat; ‘Proposed Working Definition of SPS-related Private 
Standards’, WTO Doc G/SPS/W/265/Rev1 (26 June 2012), Note by the Secretariat – Revision 
No 1; ‘Proposed Working Definition of SPS-related Private Standards’, WTO Doc 
G/SPS/W/265/Rev.2, (28 September 2012), Note by the Secretariat – Revision No 2.  
116 ‘Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group on Action 1’, WTO 
Doc G/SPS/W/276 (18 March 2014), Submission by the co-stewards of the e-working group.  
117 Ibid. 
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Committee’s formal meeting in July 2014, where Argentina referred to 
additional definitions established by the OIE and the CAC, while Canada 
pointed out the current OECD efforts to draft a definition of private 
standards.118 The Committee agreed to consider these new developments before 
circulating a report on a ‘compromise working definition of an SPS-related 
private standard’.119 
C Outlook 
It is to be expected that private standard-setting organisations will become 
legally relevant for WTO purposes, given the importance in international trade 
that they have acquired recently.120 It is argued here that a test analogous to the 
relevant-standard test as introduced in the context of Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement in US – Tuna II (Mexico) must be used to determine whether the 
SPS Agreement is applicable to private food safety standards. If this occurs, all 
SPS measures — public and private — will be covered by the SPS Agreement, 
thus acquiring a higher level of global legitimacy. 
Although a further increase in the use of private food standards is feasible and 
not disputed here, national policy will determine the extent of their implications 
for international trade. It can therefore be predicted that, based on the level of 
domestic legislative activity, public standards will overlap with and eventually 
marginalise the use of private food standards. This line of argumentation is 
further supported by the discussions within the SPS Committee.  
In any event, public standards will still be necessary to correct market failures 
associated with information asymmetries or consumption externalities. They 
will therefore continue to play a key role in establishing a minimum level of 
protection to ensure the placing on the market of safe food and to prevent 
fraud.121  
Much effort has been put into bringing forward the agenda within the SPS 
Committee. Regrettably, the progress made to date has been minimal. It 
remains to be seen whether a private SPS measure will become the basis of a 
118 ‘Existing Definitions of Private Standards in Other International Organizations’, WTO Doc 
G/SPS/GEN/1334 (18 June 2014), Note by the Secretariat. 
119 ‘Existing Definitions of Private Standards in Other International Organizations’, WTO Doc 
G/SPS/GEN/1334/Rev.1 (5 August 2014), Note by the Secretariat – Revision No 1 [1.6].  
120 Jaffe and Masakure, above 96, 317; Havinga, above 96, 516; Busch, above 96, 274. 
121 Gary Smith, ‘Interaction of Public and Private Standards in the Food Chain’ (OECD Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries Working Paper Nr 15, OECD Publishing 2009) 
AGR/CA/APM(2006)21/final, [10].  
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challenge before the WTO Dispute Settlement System. Until then, we are 
merely speculating. Ultimately, party autonomy to contract is an inherently 
private choice that may as well be the unintended effect of liberalised trade.  
V CONCLUSION 
Although voluntary in nature, food standards can be given a legally binding 
character by virtue of the presumption of compliance implicit in the WTO 
Agreements. The legal concept of the ‘international standard’ captured by the 
TBT Agreement provides a legal base from which to assess the conformity of 
domestic food measures with WTO members’ international law obligations. In 
particular, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement and its judicial interpretations 
offer a benchmark against which the legality of prima facie protectionist 
measures must be tested.  
Based on four leading cases, the WTO Appellate Body conceptualised ‘relevant 
international standards’ as those pertinent standards designed by recognised 
standardisation bodies with open membership for WTO members. A three-step 
test was identified, according to which 1) it must be apparent that the 
international standard was used as a principal constituent or fundamental 
principle in enacting that technical regulation, 2) there must be a very strong 
and close relationship between the standard invoked and the regulation enacted 
and 3) there must be a lack of contradiction between the former and the latter. 
Significantly, the WTO Appellate Body held in an argumentum e contrario that 
WTO Members have a right not to base their regulations on relevant 
international standards in cases when its use would lead to an inappropriate or 
ineffective level of protection for the fulfillment of its legitimate objectives.  
The WTO obligation to base domestic measures on relevant international 
standards, as well as the direct reference about international standards in WTO 
agreements, has contributed to the increasing importance of standard-setting 
bodies in international food trade. This development reflects the role played by 
standard-setting bodies in the creation of new forms of food governance. 
Likewise, the importance given to membership openness in international 
standard-setting bodies, as defined by the Appellate Body in US – Tuna II 
(Mexico), has highlighted the need to assess membership mechanisms. While 
this aspect is undisputed in so far as the CAC is concerned, the legal status of 
ISO membership was rather uncertain until recently. After the amendment of 
its Statutes in 2012, whereby individuals and companies are no longer eligible 
for ISO membership, the balance between WTO case law and legitimacy 
principles was able to be restored. 
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Although the definition of the term ‘international standard’ is still far from 
precise, the interpretative path developed by the WTO Appellate Body offers 
increased certainty as to the extent to which the relevant stakeholders and 
governments may rely on voluntary food standards in order to comply with 
international law obligations. It remains to be seen whether pending WTO cases 
prove the hypothesis posited here, whereby WTO law provides sufficient 
flexibilities to address the legal challenges posed by standard-setting bodies 
embedded in private law.  
